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CASE COMMENTS
preclude by contract the power of the court to allow adoption
by foster parents, people who are in a position to know and love
the child and for the child to know and love them, does not seem
to square with the avowed policy of promoting the child's welfare.
If in the future this clause comes in issue in this state, it is
hoped that the court will, with sound judgment, declare it to be
void as against public policy.
G. W. H., Jr.
RiEsmnucVE CovmqN rs-iGwT TO COMPENSATION iN EmIm T
DomAN PROCEMInnG.-Relators alleged that their lot and all the
other lots of a subdivision were subject to restrictive covenants
binding the lot owners to use their lots exclusively for residential
purposes. D, a municipal corporation, began a proceeding to con-
demn an adjoining lot. The adjoining lot owner conveyed the
lot to D before the condemnation proceeding was completed. D
constructed a toll bridge on the adjoining lot. Relators instituted
a mandamus proceeding in a circuit court to compel D to prosecute
an action in eminent domain to ascertain just compensation owing
to them. A peremptory writ was awarded as prayed for. The
Supreme Court of Appeals granted a writ of error. Held, that the
restrictive covenants should not be so construed or applied as to
require the government or one of its agencies, in the taking or
acquiring of private property for a governmental use, to respond
in damages either on the theory of a taking of a vested right or for
breach of such a covenant. Reversed. State ex rel. Wells v. City of
Dunbar, 95 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1956).
It should be noted at the outset that the court expressly stated
that "the holding does not determine the question as it relates to a
public service corporation, that question not being here involved".
Id. at 461. The decision therefore applies only to the government
or a governmental agency, and not to public service corporations
which have the power of eminent domain.
Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V; W. VA. CONST. art. III,
§ 9. The basic question in the principal case (assuming that the
building of a toll bridge would be a violation of the restrictive
covenants) is whether relators, by virtue of the building restrictions,
are entitled to compensation from D, a governmental body, which
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acquired an adjoining lot, and built a toll bridge thereon. Although
the court here answered the question in the negative, there is a
sharp conflict of authority on this question. It has been stated that
the view contrary to the principal case, which requires compensa-
tion to be paid, is the majority view. 2 NicHors, EmmIur DoMAN
§ 5.78 (3d ed. Sackman & Van Brunt 1950). And it is said in 2
AammcAN LAw oF PRoPER Y § 9.40 (Casner ed. 1952), that this
is the view of the "better reasoned authorities". In support of the
view requiring compensation in such a situation are Town of Stam-
ford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 859, 148 Ad. 245 (1928); Allen v. Detroit,
167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911); Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo.
618, 232 S.W. 1024 (1921); City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 235 N.C.
671, 71 S.E.2d 896 (1952); REsTATEMENT, PnoPERTY § 566 (1944).
In support of the view denying compensation in such a situation
are Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81
So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1955); Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d
85 (1939); City of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S.W. 916 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926).
Obviously the courts which require compensation to be paid
to the lot owners of a subdivision whose lots are subject to build-
ing restrictions, when a governmental body acquires one of the
lots for governmental purposes, recognize the interest created by
the restrictive covenants as a private property interest. The posi-
tion of these authorities is well stated by the Michigan court:
"Building restrictions are private property, an interest in real estate
in the nature of an easement, go with the land, and are a property
right of value, which cannot be taken for the public use without
due process of law and compensation therefor; the validity of such
restrictions not being affected by the character of the parties in
interest." Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 467, 473, 133 N.W. 317, 320
(1911).
The reasons most often advanced by the courts which deny
compensation in the situation herein considered are: (1) that build-
ing restrictions are contrary to public policy and void insofar as
they apply against a governmental use, and (2) that building
restrictions are contractual in nature and do not create an interest
in property. See 2 AMacAN LAw oF PRopEnTy § 9.40 (Casner ed.
1952). Most courts appear to use both lines of reasoning. See
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, supra;
Anderson v. Lynch, supra; City of Houston v. Wynne, supra.
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The reasoning of the court in the principal case, at page 461,
is as follows, "No few citizens should be permitted to so contract
as to destroy, or make prohibitive to the government, the right to
acquire property for necessary governmental purposes .... [T] hose
who enter into such covenants do so with the knowledge that the
government has the absolute right to acquire lands for governmental
purposes, and they can not be presumed to have intended an in-
terference with such right." Although not stating explicitly that
the restrictive covenants were contrary to public policy and void
as against the government, it seems that this was the underlying
theory of the decision. The court did not discuss whether the
relators had a property interest in the lots of the other owners in
the subdivision, although the decision necessarily implies that they
did not. While the West Virginia court has enforced the type of re-
strictive covenants herein discussed, it has not heretofore clearly
determined the nature of the interest created. In Withers v. Ward,
86 W. Va. 558, 560, 104 S.E. 96, 97 (1920) (dictum), the court
seems to consider the interest as a property interest. But in Cole v.
Seamonds, 87 W. Va. 19, 24, 104 S.E. 747, 749 (1920), the court,
while stating that the Withers case intimated that a property right
was perhaps the real nature of the restrictive covenants, said,
"It is unnecessary to discuss fully the exact nature of the right
created in equity by these restrictive covenants." It appears then
that the West Virginia court has enforced restrictive covenants
without finding it necessary to definitely determine whether a
property interest is created.
It would seem that the only real problem in this type of case is
whether or not a property interest is created by these restrictive
covenants. If the interest is a property interest, it is a constitutional
mandate that just compensation be paid for the taking of private
property for governmental use. U.S. CoNST. amend. V; W. VA.
CoNsT. art III, § 9. Since this is so, the public policy arguments
are of doubtful validity. If the local law treats restrictive covenants
as creating a property interest, it is difficult to see how they would
be contrary to public policy and void as against a governmental
body in its exercise of the right of eminent domain, so that no
compensation would be due to the property owners for whose
benefit the restrictive covenants were made.
The principal case establishes the rule in West Virginia that
owners of property subject to restrictive covenants are not entitled
to compensation from the government or a governmental agency
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which acquires other property subject to the restrictions, and then
violates these restrictions. It leaves open the question as it relates
to a public service corporation with the right of eminent domain.
The reasoning of the court, seemingly based on public policy con-
siderations, is not convincing. But since the court had not pre-
viously determined definitely whether a property interest was
created by restrictive covenants, it can not be said that the decision
is erroneous.
R.M.
STATUTES-INTmE,-PAToN-TEEm "STorN" AS USED IN THE
NATIONAL MOTOR VmcLE Tm~r Acr.-The appellee was informed
for violation of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, making it
a criminal offense for one to transport in interstate' or foreign com-
merce a motor vehicle, knowing it to have been "stolen". 41 STAT.
324 (1919), 18 U.S.C. § 2812 (1946). The information charged the
appellee with unlawful interstate transportation of an automobile,
lawfully acquired in South Carolina, but converted (embezzled)
before transportation. Does the term "stolen" as used in this federal
act include not only common law larceny, but also embezzlement?
Held, the word "stolen," as used in the National Motor Vehicle
Theft Act, is not limited to a taking which amounts to common law
larceny, but includes embezzlement and other felonious takings with
the intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of owner-
ship. Reversed and remanded. (6-8 decision). United States v.
Turley, 77 Sup. Ct. 897 (1957).
At the outset the Court was confronted with a distinct conflict
of authority among the federal circuits on this question. The Fifth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits favored the narrow construction which
limited the term "stolen" to mean only common law larceny.
Murphy v. United States, 206 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1953); Ackerson
v. United States, 185 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1950); Hite v. United
States, 168 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948). But the Fourth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits favored the broad construction which includes em-
bezzlement and other felonious takings. Boone v. United States,
285 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1956); Smith v. United States, 283 F.2d 744
(9th Cir. 1956); Bruce v. United States, 218 F.2d 819 (6th Cir.
1954.)
As the Hite and Ackerson cases pointed out, if this statute is to
be administered with any degree of practicability, it is desirable that
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